Introduction
In many countries the accounting profession themselves sets the rules applicable to members of the profession, and the profession itself regulates compliance with these rules. The profession regulates its members in relation to matters such as qualification, monitoring, complaints and discipline -requiring them to observe appropriate regulations and byelaws, including the profession's code of ethics. Compliance with the code of ethics, and hence the principles relating to independence, is mandatory. Members can be subject to disciplinary action and/or the imposition of generally sanctions for breaches of (or noncompliance with) the Code. These sanctions vary in severity between fines and/or exclusion from membership. If members of the public, or other regulatory bodies, judge that self regulation is not working, or is inadequate, then there is always a possibility that outside regulators will step in, as happened in the US in recent times.
In order to protect auditor independence, regulatory frameworks in various countries lay down regulations and guidelines which auditors are required to observe.
This paper analyses the provisions contained in current regulatory frameworks in the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (US), New Zealand (NZ), Australia (AU), the European Commission (EC), the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and in Bangladesh concerning professional independence in general, and the provisions that are specifically related to nonaudit services.
Significance of NAS
It is argued by many researchers (e.g. Arrunada, 1999) that it is more economic for auditors to provide other additional services to their clients, since the auditor already has a good knowledge of the client's business. The members of the Institute of Chartered Accountant in England and Wales (ICAEW) believe that unnecessarily restricting the provision of nonaudit services would have an unintended, adverse effect on the underlying quality of the audit through restrictions in knowledge and skills 1 .
In many countries audit firms provide NAS to clients which are additional to the audit, but there are often restrictions on particular services and also the caveat that care must be taken not to perform management functions or to make management decisions. The scope of services provided by audit firms to their audit (and nonaudit) clients has increased greatly (Oliverio and Newman, 2003) . It is evident from the research literature (e.g. Beattie and Fearnley, 2003) that in some cases, fees received for nonaudit services exceed the amount received from audit work. The significance of NAS is illustrated in the following tables. An analysis of fee income of the Big Five firms in 1990 and 1999 in the US is shown in table 1 and the percentage of UK companies purchasing NAS (by service category) from incumbent auditor and from elsewhere is shown in Reported in Ramsay (2001, p58) Source: Beattie, V. and Fearnley, S. (2003) * Percentage do not generally sum to 100% since some services will not be purchase at all by some companies, while other services may be bought from both the incumbent auditor and other.
Source: Beattie, V. , Brandt, R. and Fearnley, S. (1996) Table 3 below provides the data from a recent survey conducted by the Accountancy Age (June 2002 (June , pp. 1819 ) and reported in Beattie and Fearnley (2003) . The table shows the different kinds of NAS provided by large audit firms and the relationship to total fee income. Source: Beattie, V. and Fearnley, S. (2003) Two distinct contractual relationships exist when audit and NAS are provided to the same client and there is a danger that at times these distinct relationships may become blurred by the audit firm and by the directors (Beattie and Fearnley, 1998) . Under the heading of NAS, a range of services is offered by audit firms to their clients. Among others, these services are: systems and IT; staff training; payroll services for SMEs; risk management advice; taxation consultation (including tax compliance and forward tax planning advice); corporate recovery and insolvency; legal; forensic and litigation support; mergers and acquisitions; transaction support and follow up (including due diligence and initial public offerings); recruitment and human resource advice and/or provision, and portfolio monitoring.
When audit and nonaudit services are provided to the same client, the provider needs to be careful not to jeopardise their independence because there are occasions where independence may be threatened or appear to be threatened by the provision of services other than the audit. Provision of some of these services might provide either a real or perceived threat to auditor independence. Therefore accounting professional bodies of various countries set out rules and regulations to identify these possible threats to auditor independence. They also offer guidance to offset the effects of anomalies and potential threats to independence for all parties.
Approaches Adopted in Developing Regulatory Frameworks for Establishing Auditor Independence
There are various approaches to the achievement of auditor independence.
One approach is to regulate the auditor very tightly with detailed rules about what is permissible in auditing practice. This is referred to as the 'rule based approach'. One version of this approach is to allow auditors some limited freedom to engage in selected (extra) professional involvement with their clients, as has been adopted by the SEC in the US. Another version is to prohibit auditors from any involvement with their client other than the performance of the strictly statutory audit.
There are two possible sides to the argument for this latter version. One side is based on the strength of legal regulations and requirements, which could be very effective if rigidly implemented. The other side is based on the assumption that if nonaudit services (NAS) are prohibited, ignoring a client's specifically NAS needs, then the auditor could possible be placed in a dependent position and becomes reliant on the audit client's fee. There would then be a 'reduced', though strictly monitored, service offered which has the effect of limiting the auditor's role, and therefore his income.
Another approach is to set independence guidance for auditors using a conceptual framework. As this approach is based on an analysis of fundamental principles, it is also known as 'principles approach'. This approach was pioneered in the UK and Ireland in 1996 (ICAEW, 2004a) Strict independence for the accounting profession is wider than auditor independence. 'Independence' and 'objectivity' are closely related, and together form the absolutely fundamental principles of accounting and auditing practice. The fundamental principles of objectivity and independence impose on all members of the accounting profession requirements to be impartial, intellectually honest, and fair.
There should be no prejudice, bias, conflict of interests, or any other factor which might compromise objectivity in respect to the operation of professional duty.
Because of the nature of the work, independence in relation to the statutory audit has a particular and specific implication. For, in this type of work, auditors have access to private and financial information, the detail of which is confidential, while the outward assessment of which is made public as information expressed in a financial statement. Auditors form and express an opinion on the truth and fairness of the information contained in ensuing financial statements, and are therefore likely to have an impact on the financial and business dealings of both the client and users of the financial information.
Provisions in the regulatory framework for auditors, with regard to "independence" make distinctions between 'independence of mind' and 'independence in appearance'. coupled with the opinion of investors (cf. the SEC rules). Table - (2002) is similar to IFAC definition and interpretation.
EC, 2002
Independence of mind -Objectivity (as a state of mind) cannot be subject to external verification, and integrity cannot be Independence is not an absolute standard which statutory auditors must attain, free from all economic, financial and verified in advance (1.2). The state of mind which has regard to all considerations relevant to the task but no other (Annex A1).
Independence in Appearance -The avoidance of fact and circumstances which are so significant that a reasonable and informed third party would question the statutory auditor's ability to act objectively (Annex A1).
other relationships that could appear to entail dependence of any kind. Such a state is manifestly impossible as everyone has some dependency or relationship with another person (Annex A1).
US SEC Rules
Independence of mind -Objectivity is a state of mind and except in unusual circumstances a state of mind in not subject to direct There is no objection to a firm providing advisory services to a company (in addition to the audit) under the ICAEW's Professional Ethics guideline. However, there are occasions where independence may be threatened, or appear to be threatened, by the provision of services provided to a client other than the audit.
Therefore, due care must be taken to ensure a professional distance from the management functions and decisions of an audit client.
The regulatory frameworks of IFAC, ICANZ UK, Australia and EC all identify the following five threats to independence. These threats are: self interest; self review; advocacy; familiarity and intimidation. Out of these five potential threats intimidation is the only threat which does not arise from the provision of NAS because it covers the possibility that a member of the audit team may be deterred from acting objectively and exercising professional scepticism by threats or by fear of an influential or overbearing client.
Outline of the four types of threats may occur as a result of NAS
A brief outline of the four types of threats which may still occur as a result of NAS are as follows.
The selfinterest threat
An auditor's independence may be threatened if a firm or a member of the audit team benefits from a financial interest or some other selfinterest conflict with an audit client. This could arise, for example, from a direct or indirect interest in a client; or from a fear of losing the client. In other words, all work that creates a financial relationship between the auditor and the audit client may create a self interest threat. The perceived threat to independence grows with the amount/size of the ensuing fee payable, and the selfinterest caveat is thus increased further by providing NAS to the audit client 3 . But the most significant dimension of any threat, real or perceived, is likely to be the size of the total fees payable earned from a client in relation to the whole fees of the auditing firm.
The selfreview threat
This relates to the difficulty of maintaining objectivity when conducting a selfreview procedure. This can arise when any product or judgement from a previous audit (or nonaudit) assignment needs to be challenged, or reevaluated in reaching the current audit conclusions; or when a member of the audit team has previously been a director or officer of the audit client, or was employed in any position likely to affect the subject matter of the audit engagement.
Therefore an auditor should give careful consideration to every issue bearing on the selfreview threats. This includes the materiality of the amounts involved (in relation to the financial statements) and the degree of subjectivity inherent in any judgement of the elements concerned 4 .
3 Though regulatory body believes that the perceived threat to independence increased further by providing NAS to the audit client and related fees payable, the results of the empirical studies on the impact of NAS provision on auditor independence perceptions offer conflicting results. 4 Evidence from experimental studies of actual auditor independence suggests that auditor behave more independently and some time become more critical when faced with the selfreview threat (see Corless and Parker 1987; Dopuch and King 1991; Davidson and Emby 1996 The Advocacy Threat Advocacy in a simple sense is where a firm supports its clients' interests.
But advocacy can take a 'sharpened' form where the firm supports its client in a conflict or adversarial situation. For instance, advocacy in any sharpened form is likely to threaten an auditor's independence, and appears to be incompatible with 
The familiarity or trust threat
By virtue of the close relationship with an audit client, its directors, officers and employees, there is a risk that the auditor may be influenced by the client's business ambience. This caution against overfamiliarity must also include the influence of a client's personality and other personal qualities. There is the danger that these factors may subsequently contribute to excessive trust in that client. In this situation the auditor runs the risk of becoming too sympathetic to the client's interests, and because of this the objective testing of the client's representations and claims may be insufficient. An auditor should be extremely careful not to go beyond the advisory role and not drift into influencing the management sphere. Such a drift is potentially damaging to both parties.
Each of the above threats may arise in relation to the auditor's own person.
But problems may ensue from the relation to a connected person. For instance, such relationship as a member of his/her immediate family, a partner, a spouse, or any other person who is close to him for other reasons such as past or present associations in business, or some private informal obligation, contract, or indebtedness.
Safeguard to Offset Any Threat to Independence
Existing regulatory frameworks also suggest that when significant threats are identified, auditors should always consider the use of appropriate safeguards and procedures to reduce such threats to an 'acceptable' level. Auditors should be prepared to demonstrate that in relation to each identified threat, they have taken appropriate measures to preserve their objectivity. The nature of the safeguards to be applied will vary, depending upon the circumstances, and will be affected by matters such as the significance/degree of the threat, the nature of the audit engagement, the intended/target users of the audit report, and the structure of the firm providing that report. In direct relation to these potential (subjective)
problems, auditing safeguards fall into three broad categories. They are:
Those created by the profession, legislation or regulation that is regulatory safeguards and sanctions originating from legal or professional requirements. 
Safeguards within the audit firm's own systems and procedures
There must also be safeguards within the audit firm's own systems and procedures. That is, safeguards which can either extend across the firms total operation, or for engagementspecific auditing. For example, well documented independence policies regarding the identification, evaluation and application of safeguards to minimise threats; internal policies and procedures to monitor compliance with the said documented policies; policies and procedures to monitor and implement quality control of the audit engagement; availability of independent consultation procedures; internal review of partners; division of responsibilities; policies and procedures enabling staff to communicate with senior level auditors (without censure) regarding any concerns with the issues of independence, objectivity and fairdealing practice.
The first two categories of safeguards are not within an audit firm's control.
Finally, if the safeguards available are insufficient to reduce the threats to independence to an 'acceptable level', or if a company chooses not to eliminate the contaminating activities or interests which contribute to creating that threat then the only course of action available to the audit firm is to refuse to perform, and withdraw from the audit engagement.
Recent Events: US Regulatory Framework
Late 2001 Title II of the Act, entitled "Auditor Independence" makes it unlawful for an auditor to provide specified nonaudit services to audit clients, and allows the supply of NAS only with the approval of company's audit committee. The Act requires rotation of the lead audit partners at least every five years. Appendix -1 provides further details. In giving effect to the Act, the SEC developed detailed rules regarding auditor independence, and these became effective from 6 May, 2003. They are intended to enhance the independence of accountants who audit and review financial statements and prepare attestation reports that are subsequently filed with the SEC.
These rules focus on key aspects of auditor independence. They are:
allowance for the provision of certain nonaudit services; the ability and responsibility of the audit committee to insulate the auditor from pressures that may be exerted by management; the potential conflict of interest that may inadvertently be created when a former member of the audit engagement team subsequently accepts a key management position with the audit client; and the need for clear and effective communications between the auditor and audit committee. In addition, an accountant is not seen as independent (from an audit client) if any audit partner receives any form of 'compensation' based directly on selling engagements to that client for services other than audit, review, and attestation services (SealyFisher, V.
2003).
Scope of Services Provided by Auditors under SEC Rules
The SEC's principles of independence with respect to services provided by auditors are largely predicated on three basic principles, violations of which would impair the auditor's independence: (1) an auditor cannot function in the role of management, (2) an auditor cannot audit his or her own work, and (3) an auditor cannot serve in an advocacy role for his or her client.
Section 10A(g) of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 states that it shall be unlawful for an audit firm, performing an audit service, to provide to that same client, contemporaneously with the audit, any nonaudit services; including the nine categories of service set forth in the Act. The Act also states that the provision of any nonaudit service, including tax services, that is not described as a prohibited service, can be provided by the auditor without impairing the auditor's independence -but only if the service has been preapproved by the audit committee.
In US, some commented (e.g. Arthur Levitt, former SEC chairman) that the SEC should prohibit audit firms from performing most, if not all, nonaudit services.
Others supported a less stringent approach. The prohibited services contained in the SEC's rules only apply to nonaudit services provided by independent auditors to their audit clients. These rules do not limit the scope of nonaudit services provided by an accounting firm to a nonaudit client. It should be noted that under the Act, on behalf of investors, the power is removed from the management and the responsibility falls on the audit committee to preapprove all audit and nonaudit services provided by the auditor.
The categories of prohibited nonaudit services in the Act
The nine categories of prohibited nonaudit services included in the Act are: 
Bangladesh Regulatory Framework on Nonaudit Services
Besides providing statutory audit service, many chartered accountant firms in Bangladesh also provide various types of nonaudit services. Two of the most important nonaudit services are management consultancy services and tax advice.
As in other countries, there is widespread concern that the provision of nonaudit services may impair auditor independence. In November 1993, the Institute of 2)
The political, cultural and geographical climate in Bangladesh is such that many people ignore the law in respect of their activities. Recently, the ICAB conducted a survey by interviewing some of the persons and organisations connected with and affected by the chartered accountancy profession. The report on the survey revealed that some chartered accountants undercut their colleagues in respect of professional fees, which is in violation of a directive issued by ICAB. It was also revealed in the survey that there are not uncommon instances of the signature of some chartered accountants in practice being forged by unscrupulous persons, resulting in dubious audit reports being issued. This has created an unwarranted bad reputation for the profession as a whole. Surprisingly the survey also has revealed that as to ethics, there is no perceived shortcoming in the present provisions.
However, it is stated in the report that "unethical and substandard performance of a few in the profession has raised people's eye brows" (ICAB, 2003b) .
In order to check unethical activities in the profession, the following recommendations which have been suggested following the survey report (ICAB, 2003b) : like the ICAEW, the Institute should lay down some fundamental principles; a system of surveillance should be introduce by the ICAB on the performance of its members; a consensus between ICAB and business community needs to be reached so that, in the case of a private limited company, a chartered accountant firm should not be allowed to audit for more than five consecutive years.
The ICAB has admitted that ethical problems arising in the field of management consultancy are complex (ICAB 1993, p.51) . Schedule 'D' of the by laws sets out the regulations for members engaged in nonaudit services, for example, management consultancy and mechanised accounting or computer services.
But unfortunately this schedule does not set out the nature and types of management consultancy services in detail. As a result, unlike recent regulatory frameworks such as UK, IFAC, ICANZ, and the SEC, there is no detailed regulation relating to those services in Bangladesh. According to this schedule any services for management, except auditing and tax work, may be considered management consultancy services.
Also, the schedule does not provide professional guidance as to the nature of tax services that a professional may perform for his client. The salient features of this schedule, pertaining to members becoming engaged in management consultancy services, are:
· A member, whether or not in practice, must obtain the prior consent of the ICAB council to engage in management consultancy services even if not engage in audit. This appears to be a very strict rule compared to other countries. However, the criteria that the ICAB apply have not been disclosed and anecdotal evidence indicates that the consent is easily obtained.
· Any member, as well as the firm or company with which he/she is associated, is required to abide by the rules for professional conduct in the relationships with clients, the public, fellow members, and the Institute set down by the Institute (in respect of remuneration, confidentiality, substantial interest, negligence, clients money and pricing).
· An employee member is held responsible for any action of his employer which contravenes the rules for the professional conduct of the institute if he is a party thereto.
· Each member is responsible from the ethical standpoint for the conduct of a company and its directors and officers as if the company were a firm in which he is a partner.
· A member (or a partner of in any firm in which he is a partner) should not accept auditing, taxation, or any other conventional accountancy work from any client introduced to him for nonaudit services by the client's own professional accountant.
· As a matter of professional courtesy, a member should communicate with the existing client's professional accountant (or consultant) informing him of the special work he has been asked to undertake in the event of the introduction for nonaudit work other than through the existing professional accountant.
Recommended Treatment of NAS in Selected Regulatory Framework
The to independence, the auditors are required to apply judgement considering the extent of the whole relationship with the client and whether safeguards are available to mitigate the risk. SEC has the least flexibility, and in particular imposes the most restrictions on internal audit activities and prohibits actuarial services and broker/dealer services whereas, in other frameworks, no specific guideline is provided on this issue. Where prohibited, there is no scope for an independent professional judgement (by the auditor) about the seriousness of the threat and the effectiveness of available safeguards which could be applied before proceeding with any NAS. This may be due to the fact that independence requirements in the US are in the form of specific rules that are, in fact, set out by the SEC itselfwhile other regulatory frameworks are reliant on a principlesbased approach.
Although the rules are derived from underlying principles, it is compliance with the rules themselves, rather than the underlying principles that is taken as the test of independence.
But, although every endeavour is made to ensure that the rules are kept up todate and comprehensive, even a rulebased approach will always be open to circumvention. Unprincipled auditors will find new and more inventive ways of complying with the form of the rule rather than the moral substance of the rule.
Such avoidance of the spirit of the professional ruling will vary from dubious practice to outright dishonesty. an audit firm to their client. (Beattie and Fearnley 2003) .
Conclusion
There is a widespread public perception that the provision of NAS undermines auditor independence. It is also clear from the analysis of the above mentioned frameworks that the provision of NAS threatens both independence in fact and in appearance. There are some NAS for which no safeguard seem to be adequate and which are therefore subject to prohibitions. On the other hand, for some non audit services where threats are not clearcut, the auditors are required to apply professional judgments so that the seriousness of the threats is balanced against the effectiveness of available safeguards. The aim of these frameworks is to meet the expectation of knowledgeable, well informed third parties or investors. But it is not clear about the level of knowledge these individuals are expected to have and how they should acquire this knowledge as there is little in the public domain about how auditors behave (Beattie and Fearnley 2003 (3) and (4) (
ii) MECHANISED ACCOUNTING OR COMPUTER SERVICES:
In addition to the rules of ethics applicable to management consultancy work, the following rules shall apply to mechanised accounting or computer services:
(1) Such services shall not be advertised nor shall there be soliciting other than by direct communication with other member of the profession who an in practice.
(2) A member offering such services shall not accept auditing, taxation or other commercial accounting work from any client introduced to him by the client's own professional accountant for the provision of mechanised accounting or computer services.
(3) A member shall communicate as a matter of professional courtesy with the existing accountant notifying him of the special work he has been asked to undertake in the event of an introduction for mechanised accounting or computer services other than through the existing accountant.
